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This paper examines cross-country differences in labour policies and practices and employee performance
and attitudes toward work from a sample of nearly 30,000 employees in a large multinational manufacturing
firm.  The analysis shows: 1) large establishment and country differences in work practices, performance,
and attitudes toward work across countries; 2) qualitatively similar responses of workers to work practices
across countries; 3) a strong link between the establishment average of employee reports on the quality
of labour-management relations and establishment average measures of employee performance 4)
a positive relation between average employee performance and average employee-management relations
at the country level, but no relation between country level performance in the firm and measures of






















Consider a multinational firm producing similar goods and services in the same industry 
in many countries.  How much do labour practices, employee attitudes, and worker behaviour 
differ among the establishments of the firm?  Are there identifiable differences in practices, 
attitudes, and behaviour across the countries?   Do workers in different countries respond 
similarly to similar policies?  Are aggregated measures of labour practices by country related to 
aggregated measures of worker behaviour and outcomes by country? 
This paper examines these questions using data from a 2005-2006 survey of workers in 
272 establishments in a single large multinational manufacturing firm that operates in 19 
countries.  With the assistance of the firm, we undertook a web based survey and a paper survey 
of the workers.  The firm convened employee meetings in each facility to induce employees to 
respond to the survey, which gave us a sample of 29,353 respondents, with a response rate of 
greater than 60%.
1  This is one of the largest individual level data sets on labour practices, 
employee attitudes toward work, and self-reported workplace performance across countries in a 
single firm since Geert Hofstede’s (1984, 1991) study of IBM based on surveys in 1968 and 
1972.
2  Our study differs from Hofstede’s classic work in three ways.  First, whereas Hofstede’s 
surveys focused on European and Middle Eastern countries, our sample contains a large number 
                                                 
1  The web surveys were submitted directly to our web site and not to company administration. 
To protect the confidentiality of workers who filled out paper surveys, each worker placed his or 
her anonymous survey in a sealed envelope that went into box controlled by a committee of 3 
non-management employees who were instructed to drive it to an express mail/shipping facility 
immediately.  These protections of confidentiality set the stage for a high “comfort zone” for 
open responses to the questions.  In addition, the surveys were translated into the language of 
each country so that it would be accessible to most of the workers filling out the surveys who 
were native speakers.  The company’s policy is to rely on local management teams and workers 
with very selective and infrequent use of expatriates. To the extent there are immigrants in the 
company’s workforce this will mute the estimates of country differences. 
 
2 Hofstede collected about 60,000 employee surveys in each year for a total of 116,000 surveys.    
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of observations from the US and from developing and developed countries in Latin America and 
Asia as well as from Europe.  Second, our data are for manufacturing, whereas Hofstede’s 1968 
study included many workers outside manufacturing and his 1972 sample excluded 
manufacturing.  Finally, while Hofstede looked primarily at employee values and beliefs as they 
related to organizations and national culture or character, our focus is on employment relations, 
the organization of work, and the economic behaviour of workers in response to labour policies 
and practices in their establishment.
3 
Our data reveal that: 
1) Workplace practices, worker reports of performance, and attitudes toward performance 
differ significantly across establishments and among establishments in the different countries in 
which the firm operates.  In all of our analyses, estimated dummy variables for the establishment 
where a worker works show that the establishment is a major factor in responses to questions 
about workplace practices, attitudes toward work, and performance.  Replacing establishment 
dummy variables with dummy variables for the country in which the establishment is located 
identifies significant cross-country variation in labour practices and outcomes as well.   
2) Worker attitudes toward their workplace and workplace behaviour are affected by 
work policies and practices in qualitatively analogous ways across countries.  Statistically, 
regressions linking measures of worker attitudes or performance to measures of the quality of 
labour-management relations and the presence of high performance work practices yield positive 
estimated slope coefficients in most countries, although with differing magnitudes. 
3) Aggregating worker responses by establishments to make the establishment the unit of 
observation, we find that the average employee performance across establishments is strongly 
                                                 
3 In areas where the two surveys overlap, we compare results between Hofstede’s and our 
analysis.  See Blasi, Freeman, Kruse (forthcoming, 2007).  
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related to the average reported quality of labour-management relations across establishments. 
This relation holds for establishments outside the US and for establishments within the US. 
  4) Taking country as the unit of observation, workers in countries where workers report 
better employee-management relations and compensation above market levels also report better 
employee performance.  By contrast, we find no relation between the average measures of 
worker performance among countries with widely used country level indices of labour practices. 
The Data and Primary Variables 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 give the sample size and number of facilities by country in 
our survey.  Because the firm is headquartered in the United States and expanded from there to 
other countries, the US has the largest number of establishments and workers (73% and 72% of 
the totals, respectively).  The company began to expand internationally in the 1960s with regular 
acquisitions outside the US that accelerated throughout the 1980s and 1990s.  The high 
representation of American establishments allows us to estimate the level and interrelation of 
variables in the US with considerable precision, which gives us a good base with which to 
compare the level and interrelation of variables for other countries.  But the low representation of 
establishments in any other single country limits our ability to compare operations among the 
non-US countries.  The difference in the number of observations for the US and other countries 
and the way the multinational developed its overseas operations as outgrowths of US operations 
dictates the research strategy with which we examine the data.  Just as Darwin and Wallace (July 
1858) examined how species develop “varieties” from an “original type” or existing population 
as it spread across geographic areas, for instance from a mainland to islands,
 we treat the 
American mode of operating as the original type and the practices in other countries as varieties 
that depart from the original type in response to differing national regulatory and economic  
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environments.  
The survey asked a large number of questions about employee opinions and attitudes on 
the organization of work, labour-management relations, supervision, employee involvement, and 
compensation systems.  With respect to worker behaviour, it asked about expected turnover, 
behaviour toward co-workers, the effort of workers at their job and the effort of fellow 
employees, and a unique module of questions regarding worker perception and responses to 
seeing fellow workers shirk, their willingness to take innovative action at their workplace, and 
their views of how their facility performs.  Most of the questions use a five-point Likert scale, 
with higher numbers reflecting more positive assessments, though some questions are 
dichotomous.
4   
One way to analyze a survey with many questions in different domains is to select a few 
specific questions and focus on responses to them.  This has the advantage of linking the analysis 
to what respondents reported without any filter or pre-processing of the data.  An alternative 
mode of analysis is to create summary statistics of variables in the same domain, for instance 
through summated rating of the responses or factor analysis (Bartholomew and Knott, 1999), and 
to analyze those summary statistics.  Averaging responses across similar items produces a latent 
variable that has less random measurement error than does any single item, and that can 
accordingly help assess models that analyze broader behaviour than responses to a single 
question. We use both approaches in the study.  For the most part, for the sake of specificity, we 
examine responses to individual items.  Where research has found that certain practices fit 
                                                 
4 In addition to the worker survey, we obtained administrative records from the firm on the 
economic performance of 79 divisions, with each division containing facilities producing a 
similar product, or in some cases, geographic units that report performance to top management.  
Here we relied on data that the firm normally gathers from its facilities to assess their 
performance.  We have analysed these data in Blasi, Freeman, and Kruse (2007).  
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together in a group, such as in the form of “high performance workplaces,” however, we analyze 
an index of several variables.  To make sure that our results do not depend on the particular 
variables or indices on which we focus, we also estimated models that used all of the questions in 
the relevant domains and note the results from these calculations. 
We have structured our analysis around the distinction between policies or practices that 
in principle the firm’s management controls, which we take as exogenous to workers, and 
attitudinal or behavioural variables that reflect worker responses to the policies or practices.  
This structure ignores the potential feedback from worker behaviour to management’s choice of 
labour policies or practices. We focus on three independent variables as our primary measures of 
management policies or practices.  
The first variable is the employee-reported quality of employee-management relations.  
While we recognize that employer-employee relations reflect the joint behaviour of workers and 
management, management sets the main tenor of the relationship with its human resource or 
personnel policies.  As part of its overall business strategy (Boxall and Purcell, 2003), 
management can choose to take account of employee concerns in various ways (so-called high 
road labour relations) or it can ignore employee concerns and operate in a harder more 
hierarchical manner (so-called low road labour relations).  The choice of labour policies has 
consequences for economic outcomes, which in our analysis are worker reports of their work 
performance and response to work-related events, and the performance of their co-workers and 
of their facility.
5   
The second measure of management policy or practices is the absence or presence of a 
set of the specific work practices that are considered important to high performance work 
                                                 
5  For an analysis of labour-relations practices and aggregate economic outcomes, see Blanchard 
and Philippon (2006)  
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systems (Appelbaum, Bailey, Berg, and Kalleberg, 2000).  Since research has found that a firm 
needs many of these practices to improve outcomes (Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi 1997), we 
measure the extent to which a firm has a high performance workplace as an index based on 
questions relating to the presence of: employee involvement teams, training; information sharing; 
employee selection; profit or gain sharing; and job rotation, as described in the source to Table 1.   
The third measure is the rate of compensation at the facility relative to compensation in 
the broader labour market.  In principle management cannot obtain workers by going below 
market rates (at least for the long run) but management can pay wages above market rates, either 
to reduce turnover or as an efficiency wage to give workers an incentive to work harder (Akerlof, 
1982).    
Taking these variables as exogenous to worker behaviour, we examine how they affect 
four self-reported measures of worker behaviour or potential behaviour: 1) whether workers are 
likely or unlikely to look for a new job in the next six months (an outcome variable widely 
studied in analyses of job satisfaction); 2) workers’ professed willingness to work hard for the 
company (taken as an indicator of effort); 3) workers’ professed willingness to innovate products 
and services (taken as an indicator of the more creative dimension of work, which has arguably 
become more important over time in most workplaces); and 4) the worker’s willingness to 
intervene when he or she sees a co-worker shirking. The fourth variable is one that we created  to 
help test the hypothesis that modern team production and group incentive employment systems 
overcome the free rider problem inherent in any group incentive system through worker self-
monitoring (Freeman, Kruse, and Blasi, 2006; Kruse, Blasi, and Park 2006).  The variable is 
based on a four-part question that asks workers the likelihood that if they observe a fellow 
employee not working as hard or well as he or she should, they would undertake any of the  
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following actions: talk directly to the employee; speak to a supervisor or manager, talk about the 
worker in a work group or team, or do nothing.  By asking about responses in four ways, we 
obtain a more finely graded measure than if we had asked about any single response.  Analysing 
this variable for all US workers in the 2002 and 2006 General Social Survey and for workers in a 
sample of companies that we surveyed shows that workers are more willing to take action 
against shirking when they are paid by group incentive systems, and that workers who are 
willing to act against shirkers believe that their facility is more effective and that fellow workers 
work harder than do workers who are not willing to act against shirkers (Freeman, Kruse, and 
Blasi, 2006).  Given this, we seek to determine whether there are establishment or country 
differences in acting against a shirking worker.  Finally, to move beyond worker reports of their 
own behaviour or likely behaviour, we also asked about how hard their co-workers work, and 
how well their facility operated.  
Empirical Strategy 
  We have undertaken a three-step analysis of our data.  Each of these modes of analysis 
has statistical problems that we address. 
In the first step we test whether employment practices and worker performance vary 
across establishments and countries. Without such differences, this study would come to a quick 
and decisive conclusion.  If the only source of variation were among individual workers, there 
would be little point to examining how establishment practices or country labour systems 
affected workers.  With 272 establishments, we tested for differences in variables among 
establishments using an ANOVA type design, and as we shall see, found statistically significant 
results.  It is more difficult to identify country effects in our data because the survey has only a 
few establishments in specific countries outside the US (the largest number of establishments in  
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a non-US country is fourteen while there is just one establishment in five countries). These numbers 
make it difficult to differentiate the effects of country institutions on outcomes from the effects 
of establishments per se.  In the cases where countries have only a single establishment, there is 
no way to know whether the observation reflects something about the country or about the 
establishment.  Even in cases where the firm has more establishments in a country, it is possible 
that work practices or performance will differ from those in the US or in other countries for 
reasons beyond the country institutions of concern to us.  If contiguity of establishments is 
associated with similarity in practices and performance, countries could differ in their practices 
or performance because the establishments are closer to each other geographically than they are 
to the establishments in the US and other countries.  For instance, in the US, labour practices and 
performance differ between private sector firms and workers in New York and Mississippi 
although they are covered by the same national labour regulations.
6  If workers in, say, Germany 
or Belgium report different practices and performance than workers in the US, how are we to tell 
if those differences are due to differences due to national labour regulations or modes of 
operating, or to differences that might occur among establishments in different parts of the same 
country? 
Our data contain enough establishments in the US to allow us to address this problem by 
estimating the variation in practices and outcomes for the firm’s establishments across US states 
and then using this variation as an indicator of the effect of geographically contiguous areas on 
practices and outcomes in the firm.  If we assume that regional contiguity operates orthogonal to 
national institutions and is similarly sized in other countries as in the US, the variation in 
practices and outcomes across countries in our analysis would equal the effect of regional 
                                                 
6  This is not true for government employees.  In the US federal labor law covers private sector 
workers but state labor laws cover government sector employees.  
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contiguity differences in the US plus differences due to different national labour institutions.
7 
Following this logic, we estimate the contribution of US states to the variation in practices and 
outcomes in the US; and then compare this variation to the variation across countries.  If country 
institutions matter in determining a particular variable, the variation in that variable across 
countries should exceed the variation in the same variable across US states.  Put differently, our 
test for whether national labour institutions affect practices or outcomes is that the variation 
associated with countries exceeds the variation associated with states in the US.  
In the second step of our analysis, we assess the linkages of worker behaviour to 
management practices by regressing the four measures of employee behaviour described earlier 
on the measures of company policy and practice.  The problem with identifying this relationship 
is that both the independent and dependent variables are self-reports from workers.  It is possible 
that workers report practices/policies based on their idiosyncratic position or views rather than 
on the overall situation at the workplace.  For instance, worker A at establishment E might report 
that the establishment has good work practices and that the worker is willing to work hard while 
worker B at the same establishment might report that the establishment has bad work practices 
and that the worker is unwilling to work hard.  This pattern would produce a strong relation 
between work practices and willingness to work hard at the individual level but no relation 
between practices and working hard at the workplace or establishment level of interest.  We deal 
with this problem by analyzing the averages of variables among establishments as well as the 
responses of individual workers. Averaging responses across establishments eliminates the 
danger that variables are correlated because individuals have consistent but different perceptions 
                                                 
7 This assumption would not be valid if, for example, cultural differences lead to greater regional 
variation among countries than among US states, and these cultural differences are associated 
with differences in labour institutions.  
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about the establishment and thus the correlations may not hold at the establishment level. 
Third, finding country effects in our data, we relate the estimated country effects in 
worker outcomes (the coefficients on country dummy variables) to estimated country effects in 
labour practices and policies (again as reflected in the coefficients on dummy variables for 
countries).  In addition, we estimated the relation between country differences in labour 
outcomes and measures of country labour practices from the Fraser Institute’s indices of 
economic freedom and the World Economic Forum’s measures of competitiveness.  
Cross-country Patterns 
Columns 3-5 of Table 1 report the average level of our three indicators of workplace 
policy or practice: how the worker grades the firm on the quality of labour management 
relations; the index of high performance workplace policies; and a measure of whether the firm 
pays compensation above that in the local market.
8 The table note gives the exact questions used 
and the way in which we coded them for analysis. The mean values of the three policy or 
practice measures show sizable country differences. For example, workers in the Czech Republic 
and Taiwan give higher ratings to the quality of labour-management relations than those in Italy 
or Australia (column 3); workers in Canada report that their establishments have more policies 
associated with high performance workplaces than those in France (column 4); workers in China 
report that their total compensation relative to the market is significantly lower than workers in 
the United States (column 5), and so on.  The F-statistics for differences in country means given 
at the bottom of the table are sizable and highly significant. 
                                                 
8   These are self-reported measures and not objective measures of company practices.  
However,  these perceptions may be the key to worker behaviour because workers will respond 
to what they see as reality as opposed to what management may be trying to accomplish or what 
policies actually are.  See Chan and  Steven (2003)for evidence that employee retirement 
decisions reflect perceptions of the rules governing pension plans rather than the actual rules.      
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Columns 6-9 of the table give the means for our measures of the performance of 
individuals at their workplace: the likelihood that they will stay at the job; their willingness to 
work hard; their willingness to offer innovative thoughts; and their willingness to take action 
against a shirking fellow employee.  Again, the table note gives the specific questions that define 
these outcome measures.  These columns also show sizable differences in the country means and 
F-statistics that indicate that the differences are statistically significant.   
Going beyond workers’ assessment of their own behaviour, column 10 records responses 
to our question on how they view the work effort of other employees.
9  To see if employee 
reports on how hard other workers work at their facility differ from the self-reports of how hard 
they work, we correlated the two variables.  The measure of the willingness of co-workers to 
work hard is correlated at 0.122 with the measure of the worker's own work effort, so the two 
measures are indeed reflecting different perceptions.  Moreover, the mean values for the worker 
assessment of the work effort of fellow employees vary substantially among countries.  
Employees in Brazil are more likely to report that fellow workers work hard than employees in 
Australia.  Finally, column 11 records workers views of the effectiveness of their facility.  Here 
too there is considerable variation among establishments and countries. Employees in Argentina 
are more likely to report that their establishment operates effectively than employees in Taiwan.   
Because the characteristics of workers differ across establishments, it is possible that the 
cross-establishment and cross-country differences in management policies or practices and 
worker behaviour are due to differences in the characteristics of workers and jobs rather than to 
the differences among establishments and countries of concern to us.  To see whether observable 
                                                 
9 Division performance data supplied by the company is strongly correlated with these worker 
reports of facility effectiveness aggregated to the division level, indicating that these reports 
appear to measure an operational variable.  
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worker and job characteristics explain the differences in response across establishments and 
countries, we estimated the following equations: 
(1) Yijc = a + bXijc + Dj + uijc 
(2) Yijc = a + bXijc + Dc + uijc 
where Y is a specified practice or outcome variable; i refers to the worker;  j to the 
establishment employing the worker, c to the country in which the establishment is located, and 
where X ijc are covariates for the individual, Dj is a vector of dummy variables for the 
establishment; Dc is a vector of dummy variables for the country in which the establishment is 
located, and uijc is an error term.  The coefficients on Dj capture the establishment effects while 
the coefficients on Dc capture the effects of a given country relative to the deleted country, which 
is the US.  Since establishments are located in a single country, the estimated country effects are 
averages of establishment effects for the establishments in the country.     
The survey gives us detailed information on employee characteristics such as age, gender, 
marital status, family size, number of children, education, ethnicity, and whether the employee 
has a disability or not.  There is also detailed information on occupational and job characteristics 
such as fixed pay, tenure, supervisory status, managerial level, and whether the employee is 
hourly or salaried or is engaged in administrative support, production, professional/technical, 
sales or customer service work.  We estimated two functional forms for equations (1) and (2): 
ordered probits when the outcomes have several values with a natural ordering (e.g., "not at all 
true, not very true, somewhat true, and very true"), and OLS regressions with the dependent 
variables measured from 1 to 5, reflecting the five point scales used in the survey.  The statistical 
results were similar.  For ease of presentation, we give the results of the OLS regressions in the 
tables.   
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To begin with, we examined whether the reports of workers within an establishment 
coalesce at the establishment level.  If workers in an establishment report consistently on the 
quality of its labour-management relations, this is more likely to reflect establishment policy or 
practice than if worker reports vary greatly within the same establishment.  Formally, we asked 
the extent to which establishment dummy variables contributed to the variation in individual 
responses, as given in the relevant F-statistics, conditional on the covariates used in equation (1). 
Table 2 summarizes the results of analyses of the variation among establishments for the 
policy/practice and performance variables on which we have focused.   The table shows sizable 
F-statistics for establishments, implying that workers’ reports about both practices and outcomes 
have a significant establishment component.  The implication is that establishments truly differ 
in the way in which they operate. 
  Given that worker responses vary by establishment, we ask next whether these responses 
have a country component.  To do this we estimated equation (2) and tested for the significance 
of country dummy variables (replacing the establishment dummy variables).  The first column in 
Table 3 records the F-statistics for the country dummies with the establishments from all 
countries in the data set.  They are sizeable and significant.
10 As noted, however, with the small 
number of establishments outside the US, the differences could reflect differences in local 
management practices and employee behaviour among establishments that are closer 
geographically, producing regional effects separate from national institutions. To see whether the 
estimated country differences reflect more than the regional variation in variables found in a 
single country, we formed 19 dummy variables for states or groups of states in the US (thus 
                                                 
10 In addition, we also estimated the ANOVA model for the thirteen countries for which we 
have more than a single establishment and obtained larger F-statistics. The F-statistics for the 13 
country sample are:  26.04, 38.00, 29.08, 20.42, 31.05, 24.30, 17.43, 26.08, and 14.30.  
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mimicking the number of countries in our country data set) and estimated the contribution of 
these dummies to the variation in US outcomes using the ANOVA model of equation (1). The 
computations show significant differences in the value of the variables among the US states.
11  
But the F-statistics in column 2 of Table 3 are markedly lower than F-statistics for the country 
dummies in column 1 save for the measure of overall plant effectiveness, where they barely 
differ.  With this exception, these data thus imply that the country dummies reflect more than 
“normal” regional variation in labour practices and outcomes across establishments.  
The remainder of Table 3 examines another measure of the difference in estimated 
country or US state/region effects on the variables — namely, the variance in the estimated 
coefficients on the country dummies.  This measure is independent of the number of respondents 
in the countries and thus resembles country comparisons that treat countries as observations 
irrespective of their populations.  For comparison, we also calculated the variance of the 
estimated coefficients for the state dummy variables in the US.  Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 
show huge differences between these measures: the variance of the country dummy variables is 
3.8 to 13.9 times as great as the variance in state dummy variables in the US.  The greater 
variation in outcomes across the countries than across the states in the US in which the firm 
operates suggests that some of the variation across countries is due to genuine country effects 
rather than to regional effects that occur within the same country.
12 
Finally, to make sure that our results are not dependent on the specific variables under 
                                                 
11 For simplicity we refer to the geographic divisions in the US as states, although in some cases 
we used groups of states as our measure, both because some states have few observations and we 
wanted to have the same number of groups as countries.  
12 We also find, in results not reported here, that the variation among Continental European 
countries is similar to the variation among English-speaking countries, suggesting that the 
variation reflects real country effects and not underlying differences due to broader regional or 
cultural factors.  
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investigation, we analysed all of the relevant survey questions relating to labour practices, 
attitudes, and performance. There are seventy-nine such variables.  The results of this analysis 
are reported under the heading “All 79 outcomes” at the bottom of Table 3.   For the variables 
that give a clear linear ordering of outcomes, we use F-statistics from OLS regressions to 
measure the country or regional contribution to overall variation.  For the remaining variables 
that have a clear but not necessarily linear ordering, we use chi-square statistics from ordered 
probit regressions.   As a summary of these computations, the table gives the mean F-statistic or 
chi-squared statistic for the relevant variables and records the proportion of outcomes in which 
the variation across countries exceeds the variation across states in the US.  Thus, taking all of 
the variables, the variation due to countries exceeds that due to states in the US, as it does for the 
variables on which we focus.    
In short, our data show that labour practices, attitudes, and economic performance vary 
across establishments and among establishments across countries by more than one would expect 
from either of two null hypotheses: that there are no country effects; or that country effects are 
no larger than region effects within the US.   In all cases, the F-statistics for country differences 
are highly significant. 
Worker Responses to Practices 
We turn next to the question: Do labour policies and practices affect the behaviour or 
performance of workers, and if so, are their effects similar across countries?  Taking practices as 
exogenous, we estimate the following equation that relates worker reports on their performance, 
the performance of fellow employees, and establishment effectiveness to company practices or 
policies: 
(3) Pic = a + bXic + cYic+ uic  
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where Pic is a measure of performance,  i refers to the worker; c to the country in which 
the establishment is located, the Xic are covariates for the individual, and Yic measures the 
policies or practices described earlier – labour management relations, high-performance work 
places, compensation relative to market compensation.   The error term uic is assumed to be 
independent and identically distributed.
13   
We estimated equation (3) separately for workers in the 14 countries in the data set that 
have more than a single establishment, since we cannot differentiate the establishment effect 
from country effects in countries with only a single establishment.  Each regression contains all 
of the independent variables: the measures of employee-management relations, the high 
performance work index, and total compensation relative to the market. Thus, the results reflect 
the impact of each of these policies while accounting for the impact of the other policies.  On the 
basis of studies that link good workplace policies and workplace outcomes in single-nation 
studies, we expect that employee-management relations and high performance work practices 
will be positively related (Appelbaum, Bailey, Berg, and Kalleberg 2000; Huselid 1995; 
Ichniowski, Shaw and  Prennushi 1997; Cappelli and Neumark  2001).  On the basis of analyses 
of gift exchange (Akerlof, 1982), we expect that establishments with above-market 
compensation will also have better outcomes. 
The regression coefficients in Table 4 show that in all countries the vast majority of 
outcomes are significantly positively related to measures of labour relations and high 
performance workplace practices.  For example, workers who report more positive labour 
management relations or whose establishments have high-performance work practices are more 
                                                 




likely to remain with the firm, more willing to work hard, more likely to take action against 
fellow workers who shirk, and more willing to make innovative suggestions in almost every 
country.  In addition, these workers are also more likely to report that their co-workers work 
hard, and that their establishment operates effectively.  Of the 78 estimated coefficients on labour 
management relations in Table 4, 53 are significantly positive.  Of the 78 estimated coefficients 
on our measure of high performance work practices, 51 are significantly positive.  By contrast 
with these results, the estimated coefficients on the relation of outcomes to the measure of total 
compensation relative to the market in Table 4 show a weaker positive relation: 22 of the 78 
estimated coefficients are significantly positive.  The implication is that within the variation 
observed, labour practices are more important factors than are levels of pay. This is consistent 
with empirical research within single countries that compensation systems do not constitute a 
“silver bullet” in employment relations (see Heneman, Fay, and Wang, 2005). 
The evidence in Table 4 indicates that regardless of the overall labor system in a country 
-- regulated Western European countries, developing countries, or the market-driven US – 
workers respond similarly to workplace practices.  However, there are some noticeable 
differences in the magnitude of the estimated coefficients in Table 4 and differences in the 
effects of particular policies on outcomes across countries.  For example, employment relations 
have a smaller impact on the workers' expected turnover behaviour in China than in Canada, and 
a smaller impact on their willingness to work hard in Korea than in Canada.   In France the 
estimates show a slight negative impact of employment relations on expected turnover, 
willingness to innovate, and the anti-shirking index, in contrast to the positive estimated impacts 
in most other countries.   Further, that the French are willing to work harder than Americans in a 
high performance work system.    
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To see whether these differences reflect differences in behaviour across countries or 
random variation in the coefficients, we computed statistics that compare the variation in slope 
coefficients for each policy variable on each outcome across the countries.  Then we estimated 
regressions of equation (3) for US states or groups of states and, following the logic we used 
earlier to analyze country dummy variables, we contrasted the variation in slope coefficients 
among countries to the analogous variation in slope coefficients among states and groups of 
states in the US.  If responses truly differ by country, the variation in the slope coefficients 
among countries should exceed the variation in slope coefficients among US states. 
Table 5 summarizes the results of these computations.  Column 1 gives the F-statistics 
that test for equality of slope coefficients from a pooled regression with country dummy 
variables that allow for separate intercepts but impose identical coefficients on covariates.  The 
F-statistics reject the equality of the slope coefficients.  They show that there is significant cross-
country variation in the magnitudes of coefficients estimated in Table 4.  Column 2 gives F-
statistics for the equality of slope coefficients from the comparable analysis for US states.  These 
F-statistics are smaller than those for the countries, suggesting that workers responses to the 
relevant policies or practices differ more across countries than across states.  Still, the difference 
in F-statistics between the country contrasts and state contrasts are smaller in the Table 5 
analysis of slopes than in the Table 4 analysis of constant terms.  Columns 3 and 4 of Table 5 
record the variances of the estimated slope coefficients from the regressions for countries and 
states, respectively. The variances for the estimated coefficients are 1.2 to 8.6 times larger among 
countries than among US states. These differences are smaller than the analogous difference 
found in Table 4 between the variance in the estimated country and state dummy variables.  
From these statistics, it appears that country effects are greater for the level of employee  
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performance or work attitudes than for the response of performance or attitudes to establishment 
level practices and policies. 
Finally, going back to the Table 4 regressions, we note that the estimated impact of 
particular policy variables are similar across countries on some outcomes and different on other 
outcomes. There are relatively modest differences across the countries (and across US states) in 
the impact of workplace policies on willingness to work hard.  By contrast, there are noticeable 
differences across countries in the impact of policies and practices on the likelihood that a 
worker will seek a new job and in their assessment of the effectiveness of their facility. In 
addition, the quality of employee-management relations and total compensation relative to the 
market have a significant impact on country differences in workers’ reports of their co-workers' 
willingness to work hard, while the presence of a high performance work system does not. The 
greatest variation across countries in the estimated slope coefficients is in the relationship of 
high-performance policies to workers' willingness to interfere with a shirking fellow employee.  
This suggests that the effects of policies on anti-shirking may be greatly affected by country 
cultures and institutions.  
In sum, we conclude that the relationship between workers' responses and policies and 
practices are qualitatively similar across the countries, but that there are still notable differences 
in the magnitude of responses to policies and practices and in the relation between particular 
policies and outcomes across countries.  
Establishment Level Patterns 
 
The analyses thus far have related worker reports of their work behaviour or that of their 
co-workers to reports of practices and policies at their workplace.  As pointed out, however, 
relations found in variables at the level of individuals need not generalize to the establishment,  
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much less to countries.  Just as there are problems in making inferences about individual 
behaviour from correlations in regional or other aggregated data due to the ecological correlation 
problem
14 there are problems in making inferences from analyses of responses of individuals to 
workplace policies or practices to how workers at the workplace would respond to the policies or 
practices.  While the evidence in Table 3 that workers give broadly similar reports about their 
establishment suggests that regressions based on individuals should generalize to entire 
workplaces or facilities, the only way to see whether variables are related at the establishment 
level as they are among individuals is to estimate relations using establishment level measures of 
variables.
15  Accordingly, we computed the establishment averages of the three workplace policy 
and practices variables and of the six employee reports of their workplace performance and 
regressed the establishment averages of the outcome variables on the establishment averages of 
the workplace practices or policies.  
Table 6 records the estimated regression coefficients and standard errors for the policy or 
practice variables.  To allow for any differences between the US and other countries, these 
regressions include a dummy variable for the US.  The results in the first column show that the 
average quality of employee-management relations in establishments has a statistically 
significant effect on the establishment average of the six outcome variables. Figures 1 to 3 
display the positive relation between the establishment average employee assessment of the 
quality of labour-management relations and a) employee perceptions of the effort of co-workers 
                                                 
14    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ecological_correlation. Also, see 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ecological_fallacy. 
15  See Lubinski, D., & Humphreys, L. G. (1996).   Seeing the Forest From the Trees: When 
Predicting the Behavior or Status of Groups, Correlate Means. Psychology, Public Policy, and 
Law, Volume 2, pps. 363-376.  
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at the work site; b) employee willingness to engage in anti-shirking activity; and c) facility 
effectiveness.  The figures differentiate between US and non-US establishments.  Both show 
similar positive slopes for the relation between the quality of labour-management relations and 
the outcomes.  The pattern for the outcome variables not given in the figure is similar.   
The regressions in Table 6 show much weaker results for the impact of high performance 
work places and compensation above market levels on the outcome variables.  In only one of the 
six regressions is the coefficient on high performance work systems a significant predictor of an 
establishment level outcome.  Also, in only one of the six regressions is the coefficient on total 
compensation relative to the market a significant predictor of the establishment level outcome 
variables.  
Should we take the establishment level regressions as valid, showing that worker 
perceptions of labour-management relations is the key factor in differentiating employee 
behaviour and work performance within the firm, while high performance workplaces and 
compensation are of minor importance?  If each establishment had a single set of practices that 
affected all workers the same, the calculations in Table 6 would provide the best estimate of the 
effect of those policies or practices in our data. But some of the variation in worker reports of 
policies or practices within an establishment could reflect genuine differences in practices within 
the establishment rather than measurement error or idiosyncratic reporting by workers.  Workers 
who report bad employee-management relations when the majority of workers say employee-
management relations are good, or who report that their firm has high performance workplace 
practices, or that compensation is above average when other workers report the opposite, may in 
fact be accurately reporting their situation.  On average, supervisors may be good, but the 
individual’s supervisor may be horrible. On average, the firm may have the practices that  
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constitute a high performance workplace at some worksites but not at others.  And so on.  If all 
of the within-establishment variation in reported policies or practices were due to within-facility 
differences in the presence or absence of the policies or practices, the correlations among 
variables at the individual level would give a more accurate picture of relations than the 
correlations at the establishment level.  In this case, it is the analyses of the establishment level 
variables that would be subject to measurement error and underestimate the impact of policies 
and practices on behaviour and outcomes.  Given that variation of worker reports on 
establishment practices is likely to reflect both genuine within-establishment variation and 
idiosyncratic reporting by workers, the two estimates are likely to bound the true behavioural 
impact of the policies or practices.  
These considerations offer an explanation for the weaker estimated effect of high 
performance workplaces in the establishment level regressions in Table 6 than in the individual 
level regressions in Table 3.  High performance workplaces are likely to cover only part of 
establishments – the activity of production workers using a particular technology or engaged in 
particular tasks, for example.  If high performance workplaces have good effects on various 
outcomes, the workers in that part of the establishment would report those outcomes, giving 
strong results in the regressions for individuals.  If the high performance workplace increased the 
effectiveness of the overall facility, which all workers recognized, the result would be a stronger 
result on that outcome in establishment level regressions than on outcomes such as the likelihood 
of leaving the workplace that presumably depend solely on whether the individual worker was 
covered by the high performance practices.  This could produce differential estimated effects of 
high performance workplaces on particular outcome variables of the type found in Table 6 – a 
positive link between worker reports on the effectiveness of their facility and the proportion  
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reporting a high performance workplace but no such link between some of the other outcomes 
connected with high-performance practices found in the regressions for individuals.  To 
determine whether this interpretation is correct would require information on the actual variation 
of practices within facilities, which we do not have.  
The weak relation between total compensation relative to the market and outcome 
variables in Table 6, by contrast, is consistent with the story told at the individual worker level in 
Table 3, where worker reports on total compensation relative to the market were the most weakly 
related policy variable to measures of success. This underlines the conclusion from Table 3 that 
compensation systems do not constitute a “silver bullet” in employment relations systems.    
Country Level Patterns 
 
Finally, to see whether the relations between practices and policies and outcomes hold for 
country aggregates, we examine the correlations between the estimated coefficients on the 
country dummy variables for each of the policies/practices under study and the estimated 
coefficients on the country dummy variables for each of the country level outcomes from the 
estimates of equation (2) underlying Table 3.  The coefficients on the dummy variables show 
whether a country is relatively high or low in a given practice or outcome compared to the 
omitted country, the US.  The correlation between the coefficients thus gives the cross-country 
relation between the relevant variables.   
The correlations in the top panel of Table 7 show moderately sized positive relations 
between each of the policy/practice variables and the performance or outcome measures at the 
country level of aggregation.  Consistent with the results for establishments, the strongest 
correlation is between the country measures of employee-management relations and the country 
measure of facility effectiveness.  In addition, the country level calculations show that employee- 
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management relations is moderately positively correlated with country measures of being likely 
to stay with the firm, and with the willingness of workers to innovate and the likelihood that they 
would intervene with shirking co-workers.  As with the establishment level analyses, the 
country-level measure of the high performance work system index is not correlated with country-
level outcomes, possibly for the same reason -- that high performance work systems are 
concentrated among certain groups of workers and firms.  Total compensation relative to the 
market at the country level is highly correlated with country-level measures of willingness to 
innovate and moderately correlated with country-level measures of anti-shirking.  Overall, given 
the small number of establishments used to obtain the estimated country effects, the results are 
reasonably consistent with the patterns found within countries.  
  The bottom panel of Table 7 relates the country dummy measures of performance or 
outcomes to indicators of the strength of institutions in country labour markets from the 
Economic Freedom Index of the Fraser Institute and the Global Competitiveness Reports of the 
World Economic Forum. The Fraser Institute's index rates countries with less labour market 
regulation of wages, dismissal, employment, and collective bargaining as having higher scores in 
economic freedom.
16  The Market Efficiency component of the Global Competitiveness Index 
(Lopez-Claros, 2006), based on a poll of 11,000 business executives, gives higher scores to 
countries where executives report that: wages are not determined by a centralized bargaining 
process, labor-employer relations are cooperative, hiring and firing of workers is flexibly 
                                                 
16  To earn high marks in the labor market regulation index (5B), a country must allow market 
forces to determine wages and establish the conditions of dismissal, avoid excessive 
unemployment benefits and refrain from the use of conscription” (Gwartney and  Lawson 2006, 
p. 12)  Many of the Fraser Institute measures of economic freedom use data from the Global 
Competitiveness Index See Gwartney and  Lawson (2006: 181-182).   
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determined by employers, and pay is related to worker productivity.
17 
The correlations in the bottom panel of Table 7 show that these global indicators of 
country labor market institutions are not correlated positively with the worker reports of 
economic performance in the establishments in the firm under study.  The Fraser Institute’s 
Labor Market Regulation score (for which higher values indicate less labor market regulation) is 
negatively correlated with the country measure of the work effort of co-worker.  The World 
Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Index is negatively correlated with the country 
measures of willingness to work hard, willingness to innovate, and perceived co-worker effort 
and facility effectiveness. As for the more detailed measures of institutional practices, the 
countrywide measure of regulation in hiring and firing practices is negatively correlated with the 
country measures of willingness to innovate, anti-shirking, and seeing co-workers as working 
hard; the countrywide measure of flexibility of wage determination is negatively correlated with 
the anti-shirking index; the measure of pay being closely tied to productivity is negatively 
correlated with country measures of willingness to innovate, anti-shirking, seeing co-workers as 
working hard, and facility effectiveness; and so on.  These patterns do no imply that the 
aggregate measures of country practices are invalid, but rather that what matters within a firm are 
its own establishment workplace relations and practices, as opposed to country-level regulations 
and reputation affecting competitiveness.    
Conclusion 
This study has examined work practices, employee performance, and attitudes toward 
work at the level of individual workers, establishments, and countries using a survey of nearly 
                                                 
17   The individual country data and the text of the questions asked in the poll can be found on 
pps. 485-489. (Lopez-Claros, 2006, Chapter 1.1)    
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30,000 employees in a large US multinational manufacturing firm that operates 272 
establishments in 19 countries.  The survey is one of the largest surveys of workers across 
countries in a single firm.   
Our analysis found that employment policies and practices, and employee performance 
and attitudes toward work, vary among establishments and across countries.  To help identify 
any independent effect of country labour institutions or practices on workers and establishments, 
we compared the variation in practices and outcomes across the countries in which the firm 
operates with the variation in practices and outcomes across states or groups of states in the US 
in which the firm operates.  This comparison revealed greater variation across countries than 
across states – a pattern consistent with the notion that country institutions have an independent 
effect on labour practices and performance, beyond any effects related to contiguity of facilities.  
We also found that worker performance and attitudes were strongly related to policies and 
practices in broadly similar ways across these countries, though we noted some divergences for 
particular policies or outcomes.   
To deal with the problem that patterns found among individuals need not generalize to 
establishments or countries, we analysed the relation among establishment level averages of 
variables.  This analysis found a strong relation between the quality of labour-management 
relations and employee behaviour and outcomes consistent with our analysis of data for 
individuals.  But the analysis of establishment averages also found weak or negligible relations 
between high performance work places and employee behaviour and outcomes, whereas the 
analysis of individuals found stronger relations.  This could reflect genuine variation in 
workplace policies or practices within establishments, or idiosyncratic reports on policies, 
practices, and performance by individuals that biases upward the estimates of the relation  
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between policies/practices and outcomes at the level at which those policies and practices are set.  
We found only weak relations in both the individual and establishment analyses between the 
worker reporting above-market compensation and performance or attitude toward work.  
At the country level, our analysis revealed a positive relation between the average quality 
of employee-management relations at the country level and average employee performance.  By 
contrast, we found no relation between our measures of employee behaviour or attitudes and 
measures of national labour relations that differentiate countries by their degree of institutional 
vs. market determination of outcomes.  This suggests that the establishment level policies and 
practices of the multinational trump the effect of these broader features of labour markets in 
determining how workers behave within the firm.  
Overall, our analyses support the idea that while labour practices and performance vary 
across countries, good labour management relations is an important factor in worker behaviour 
and workplace performance in virtually all situations, while the effects of high performance 
practices and compensation on performance and attitudes are weaker. Moreover, employee-
management relations has a strong relation not only to standard performance measures such as 
likely turnover and willingness to work hard, but also to our innovative measure of how workers 
would respond to a shirking co-worker.  Further research is needed to identify the specific ways 
in which management treats workers and communicates with them that underlies worker feelings 
that labour-management relations are good.   
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            Table 1: Country Means of Key Variables and Questions that Define them                      
         WORKPLACE POLICIES     OWN PERFORMANCE     CO-WORKER/FACILITY 
                       PERFORMANCE 
  No. of    No. of  Grade on High-  Total comp Likely to  Willing   Willing  Anti-     
 employees  facilities  ee-mgt.  perf.  relative  stay to  work  to  shirking Co-workers Facility 
       relations  index  to mkt    hard  innovate index  work  hard  effectiveness
                          
         0-4 scale  0-6 scale 1-5 scale  1-4 scale  1-5 scale  1-4 scale 4-16 scale  0-10 scale  0-4 scale 
Overall 29,353  272  2.27 2.93 2.69 0.59 3.94 3.01 9.78 6.89 2.69
                          
Argentina 28  1  2.96 3.33 2.50 3.46 4.27 3.39 12.13 8.00 3.16
Australia 103  2  1.72 2.83 2.46 2.96 3.44 2.94 9.75 6.07 2.31
Brazil 1,126  5  2.31 3.38 2.75 3.21 4.04 3.16 10.68 8.19 2.52
Canada 415  2  2.46 3.98 2.94 3.60 3.95 3.06 9.66 6.79 2.84
China 937  7  2.01 3.14 1.98 3.04 3.94 2.86 10.13 7.62 2.66
Czech Republic  87  1  2.55 3.69 2.61 3.47 3.88 3.12 11.16 7.18 2.75
                          
Finland 101  1  2.28 2.45 2.58 2.63 3.28 2.76 9.16 7.08 2.57
France 215  5  2.08 3.32 2.55 3.52 3.33 2.66 9.60 5.80 2.63
Germany 479  14  2.46 3.19 2.75 3.60 3.69 3.35 11.15 7.04 2.53
Italy 808  3  1.79 2.35 2.43 3.50 4.14 2.94 10.45 7.20 2.79
Korea 445  3  2.08 2.92 2.38 3.43 3.88 2.60 9.18 7.55 2.60
Mexico 2,460  7  2.32 2.98 2.69 3.25 3.97 3.03 11.05 7.34 2.92
                          
Netherlands 74  6  2.39 2.67 2.52 3.68 2.96 3.07 11.65 6.79 2.51
South Africa  49  1  2.70 2.83 2.59 3.65 4.43 3.33 10.47 7.50 3.09
Sweden 234  4  2.13 2.91 2.24 3.47 3.48 2.52 9.02 7.03 2.51
Switzerland 115  1  2.33 3.66 2.31 3.62 3.67 2.68 9.91 6.27 2.74
Taiwan 27  1  2.52 3.63 2.48 2.89 4.00 2.78 9.32 6.63 2.33
United Kingdom  415  9  2.08 3.41 2.66 3.33 3.78 3.35 10.10 6.85 2.56
United States  21,235  199  2.29 3.28 2.75 3.44 3.95 3.01 9.59 6.72 2.67
 
                          
F-stat. for differences     18.20 29.49 38.39 30.86 25.24 24.13 32.63 49.56 24.06








Grade on Employee-Management Relations. 0-4 scale.  “If you were to rate how well this company takes care of workers on a scale similar to 
school grades, what grade would you give in these areas? (C is an average grade.)  Overall relations with employees.” (A=4, B=3, C=2, D=1, 
F=0). 
 
High Performance Work System Index.  0-6 scale.  Composed of one point for each of the following components: Employee Involvement 
Team:  "Some companies have organized workplace decision-making in ways to get more employee input and involvement.  Are you personally involved 
in any team, committee or task force that addresses issues such as product quality, cost cutting, productivity, health and safety, or other workplace issues?" 
(0=no, 1=yes), 1 point; Training. "In the last 12 months have you received any formal training from your current employer, such as in classes or seminars 
sponsored by the employer?" (0=no, 1=yes), 1 point; Information Sharing: “If you were to rate how well this company takes care of workers on a 
scale similar to school grades, what grade would you give in these areas? (C is an average grade.)  Sharing information with employees.” (A, 
B, C, D, F), 1 point for A, .75 for B, .5 for C, .25 for D, and 0 for F;  Employee  Selection: “On a scale of 1 to 7 please evaluate how 
effective your work area or team functions in the following areas: Selecting the very best people to be part of our team/area.” (1=very 
ineffective, 4= neutral, 7=very effective),” 1 point for a score of 7, .83 points for a score of 6, .66 points for a score of 5, .5 points for a score 
of 4, .33 points for a score of 3, .17 points for a score of 2, 0 points for a score of 1; Profit or Gain Sharing: “In your job are you eligible for 
any type of  performance-based pay such as individual or group bonuses or any type of profit sharing? (0=no, 1=yes), 1 point;  Job Rotation:  
“How frequently do you participate in a job rotation or cross-training program where you work or are trained on a job with different duties 
than your regular job?”  (1=never, 2=occasionally, 3=frequently), 1 point for “frequently”,  .5 points for  “occasionally”,  0 points for “never”, 
 
Total compensation relative to the market. 1-5 scale.  "Do you believe your total compensation is higher or lower than those of employees 




Unlikely to Look for New Job. 1-4 scale.  “How likely is it that you will decide to look hard for a job with another organization within the 
next twelve months?  (1= already looking; 2= very likely, 3= somewhat likely, 4= not at all likely).” 
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Willing To Work Hard.  1-5 scale. “To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?  “I am willing to work harder than I have 
to in order to help the company I work for succeed.”   (1= strongly disagree; 2=disagree; 3= neither agree nor disagree; 4= agree; 5= strongly 
agree).” 
 
Willing to Innovate. 1-4 scale. “I would be willing to be more involved in efforts to develop innovative products and services.  (1= Not at 
all, 2= very little, 3= to some extent, 4= to a great extent).” 
 
Anti-shirking Index.  4-16 scale.  “If you were to see a fellow employee not working as hard or well as he or she should, how likely would 
you be to: a) Talk directly to the employee, b) Speak to your supervisor or manager, c) Talk about it in a work group or team, d) Do nothing. 
(reverse-coded) (Answers on all four parts of this question were coded on 1-4 scale for a summated rating with 1= not at all likely, 2= not very
likely, 3=somewhat likely, 4= very likely).” 
 
EVALUATION OF CO-WORKERS AND FACILITY PERFORMANCE 
 
Co-workers Work Hard.  0-10 scale. “At your workplace, how hard would you say that people work?  Please rate on a scale of 0 to 10.  (0= 
not at all hard, 10= very hard). 
 
Facility Effectiveness.  0-4 scale.  “If you were to rate the facility you work in on a scale similar to school grades, what grade would you give 
in these areas?  Getting the job done that has to get done efficiently.  (C is an average grade.) (4=A, 3=B, 2=C, 1=D, 0=F).”  
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Table 2: Statistical Tests for Establishment Level Effects in Labor 
Practices/Policies 
 
Based on regressions that control for job and demog. characteristics, 
with 245 establishment dummy variables 
     F-stat. for     
     establishment   
      differences   
Policies          
  Grade on ee-mgt relations  8.52    
 High-perf.  index  10.15    
  Total comp relative to mkt.  6.75    
Own performance       
  Likely to stay  7.70    
  Willing to work hard  5.00    
  Willing to innovate  3.73    
 Anti-shirking  index  4.14    
Co-worker/facility performance       
  Co-workers work hard  5.28    




Table 3: Statistical Tests for Country Effects Compared to Regional 
Effects in US Establishments 
 
Based on regressions that control for job and demographic characteristics          
     F-stat for   F-stat for  Variance of dummy coeffs. 
     country  U.S. state        
     diffs.  diffs.  Countries  U.S. states  Ratio (4/5) 
      (1)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Policies               
  Grade on ee-mgt relations  18.43 11.27 0.072  0.015 4.94
 High-perf.  index  26.85 10.13 0.168  0.026 6.48
  Total comp relative to mkt.  20.27 10.78 0.053  0.014 3.78
Own performance            
  Likely to stay  18.17 15.36 0.075  0.011 6.85
  Willing to work hard  23.56 8.93 0.111  0.008 13.91
  Willing to innovate  18.06 6.05 0.055  0.005 10.17
 Anti-shirking  index  12.50 10.34 0.687  0.081 8.51
Co-worker/facility performance            
  Co-workers work hard  18.47 6.22 0.292  0.041 7.04
 Facility  effectiveness  11.65 10.90 0.051  0.011 4.45
               
All 79 outcomes               
    Average F-statistic (37 outcomes) 24.86 10.43 7.891  1.904 4.14
    Average Chi-sq. statistic (42 outcomes)  259.65 160.34 0.078  0.013 5.84
    Percent of outcomes with higher            
    statistics for country dummies (79 outcomes)    83%     100%
               
No. of country/state dummies     19 19 19  19   
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Table 4: Regression Coefficients Linking Policies to Performance Measures 
 
Regressions are done separately by country.                   
Dependent variables are at the top of each column.  Each regression contains the three independent variables at 
left, plus basic job and demog. characteristics. 
 
    Likely  to   Willing      Willing   Anti-   Co-workers Facility   
    stay   to  work    to   shirking   work  hard    effectiveness
       hard   innovate   index         
                                         
Ee-mgt rels. coeff.                   
  All  countries  0.22 ***  0.19 *** 0.03 *** 0.32 *** 0.34 ***  0.32 *** 
  Australia  0.10   0.18   -0.01   0.36   0.99 *  0.56 *** 
  Brazil  0.15 ***  0.16 *** 0.01   0.30 *** 0.08   0.33 *** 
  Canada  0.30 ***  0.21 *** -0.05   0.63 *** 0.29 **  0.35 *** 
  China  0.17 ***  0.14 *** 0.09 **  0.13   0.37 ***  0.27 *** 
  France  -0.04   0.25 **  -0.15   -0.08   0.88 ***  0.24 *** 
  Germany  0.28 ***  0.20 *** 0.01   0.17   -0.04   0.34 *** 
                      
  Italy  0.14 ***  0.16 *** -0.02   0.22   0.14   0.17 *** 
  Korea  0.32  ***  0.12  0.11  0.09   0.61  ***  0.21 *** 
  Sweden  0.20 ***  0.10   -0.10   0.02   -0.06   0.27 *** 
  United  Kingdom  0.38 ***  0.24 *** 0.10 **  0.09   0.38 ***  0.31 *** 
 United  States  0.25  ***  0.21 *** 0.02 *** 0.34 *** 0.38 ***  0.34 *** 
  Mexico  0.10 ***  0.13 *** 0.08 *** 0.18 **  0.20 ***  0.19 *** 
                      
Hi-perf. index coeff.                    
  All  countries  0.06 ***  0.08 *** 0.07 *** 0.31 *** 0.13 ***  0.08 *** 
  Australia  0.32   0.24   -0.03   0.00   0.34   0.22 * 
  Brazil  0.08 ***  0.10 *** 0.04 *  0.14   0.05   0.06 *** 
  Canada  0.03   0.17 *** 0.08 *  0.44 **  0.31 ***  0.13 *** 
  China  0.02   0.07 **  0.15 *** 0.52 *** 0.09   -0.01  
  France  0.23 ***  0.14 *  0.25 *** 0.45   -0.06   0.03  
  Germany  0.00   0.13 *** 0.04   0.06   0.19 *  0.05 * 
                      
  Italy  0.10 **  0.09 **  0.12 *** 0.32 **  0.03   0.07 * 
  Korea  0.06   0.06   0.14 **  0.12   0.06   0.19 *** 
  Sweden  0.21  ***  0.16 ** 0.13 ** 0.13   0.30  **  0.06 * 
  United  Kingdom  0.06    0.08  0.02  0.34 * 0.21  **  0.07 * 
 United  States  0.05  ***  0.07 *** 0.07 *** 0.32 *** 0.16 ***  0.08 *** 
  Mexico  0.08 ***  0.08 *** 0.06 *** 0.35 *** 0.08   0.10 *** 
                      
Total comp relative to market                  
  All  countries  0.09 ***  0.05 *** -0.01   0.00   0.02   0.03 *** 
  Australia  0.05    0.17  -0.01  -0.01   -0.04    -0.15  
  Brazil  0.14  ***  0.05  -0.05  -0.06   -0.10   0.02  
  Canada  0.11  **  0.01  -0.02  -0.33   -0.01    -0.06  
  China  0.12  ***  0.05  0.02  0.18  -0.14    -0.04  
  France  0.10   0.19 *  -0.09   0.09   -0.31   0.12  
  Germany  0.06   0.10   -0.02   0.04   -0.20   -0.01  
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  Italy  0.18 ***  -0.01   -0.14 *** -0.01   -0.02   -0.09 ** 
  Korea  0.03   0.13   -0.12   0.53 *  0.57 **  0.04  
  Sweden  0.10   0.12   -0.06   0.40   -0.33 *  0.07  
  United  Kingdom  0.03   0.05   -0.09 *  0.12   0.35 **  0.00  
 United  States  0.09  ***  0.05 *** 0.00  0.00   0.01    0.03 * 
   Mexico  0.08 ***  0.06 **  0.06 *** 0.05     0.21 ***  0.02    
* Significantly different from zero at p<.10  ** p<05  *** p<.01               
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Table 5: Statistical Analysis of Slope Coefficients   
Based on separate regressions for each country and state, controlling for job and demographic characteristics 
    
F-stats. for equality of 
coeffs.    
Variance of coeffs. across 
countries/states 
               







Dep. var.  Indep. var.  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Likely to stay               
 
Grade on ee-mgt 
relations 9.90*** 2.20** 0.014  0.002 8.543
 High-perf.  index  3.08*** 1.98** 0.006  0.001 6.747
 
Total comp relative to 
mkt.  1.89** 1.69 0.005 0.001 3.505
Willing to work hard for co.            
 
Grade on ee-mgt 
relations  1.97** 1.38 0.002 0.001 1.234
 High-perf.  index  1.16 0.43 0.001  0.000 2.844
 
Total comp relative to 
mkt. 1.22 0.69 0.007  0.001 9.660
Willing to innovate               
 
Grade on ee-mgt 
relations 3.11*** 2.50** 0.006  0.002 3.241
 High-perf.  index  3.10*** 3.05*** 0.004  0.001 3.456
 
Total comp relative to 
mkt. 2.52** 1.68 0.005  0.001 3.948
Anti-shirking index            
 
Grade on ee-mgt 
relations  1.13 1.31 0.085 0.016 5.346
 High-perf.  index  2.85** 1.82 0.045  0.012 3.807
 
Total comp relative to 
mkt.  0.78 1.24 0.055 0.014 3.887
Co-workers work hard            
 
Grade on ee-mgt 
relations 4.25*** 2.31** 0.066  0.013 5.153
 High-perf.  index  1.46 0.78 0.010  0.002 4.640
 
Total comp relative to 
mkt. 3.12*** 1.62 0.063  0.010 6.163
Facility effectiveness            
 
Grade on ee-mgt 
relations 13.57*** 3.49*** 0.013  0.001 8.624
 High-perf.  index  4.77*** 1.25 0.002  0.000 6.854
 
Total comp relative to 
mkt.  2.60** 1.80 0.004 0.001 4.181
No. of countries/states     12 12 12  12   
      
Note: * Significantly different from zero at p<.10  ** p<05  *** p<.01 
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Table 6:  Relation Between Establishment Average Policies and Establishment 
Average Outcomes 
Each row represents separate regression, with dependent variable at left.          
     Grade on    High-   
Total 
comp      
     ee-mgt.    perf.    relative       
      relations     Index     to mkt     U.S. dummy 
Establishment-level regressions                 
predicting survey measures                 
  Likely to stay  0.433   -0.035   0.244    -0.007  
     (0.050) ***  (0.035)   (0.049)  *** (0.038)  
  Willing to work hard  0.248   0.047   -0.037    0.233  
     (0.051) ***  (0.035)   (0.049)    (0.039) *** 
  Willing to innovate  0.152   0.058   -0.055    -0.032  
     (0.053) ***  (0.037)   (0.052)    (0.041)  
 Anti-shirking  index  0.824   0.145   0.034    -0.793  
     (0.187) ***  (0.131)   (0.182)    (0.143) *** 
  Co-workers work hard  0.497   -0.043   -0.033    -0.291  
     (0.124) ***  (0.087)   (0.121)    (0.095) *** 
 Facility  effectiveness  0.378   0.068   0.060    0.017  
      (0.051) ***  (0.035) *  (0.049)     (0.039)   
Note: * Significantly different from zero at p<.10  ** p<05  *** p<.01;  n=258     
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  Table 7:  Correlations Among Policies and Economic Outcomes at the Country Level.   
            
Based on 19 countries                   
  Outcomes^:  Likely to  
Willing 




workers  Facility 
      stay 
work 
hard innovate  index 
work 
hard effectiveness
Worker reports on labor practices             
at  their  facilities^          
  Grade on ee-mgt relations  0.344 0.230 0.352 0.384 0.187  0.606 
 High-perf.  index  0.143 0.118 -0.150 -0.027 -0.147  0.020 
  Total comp relative to mkt.  0.103 0.239 0.613 0.346 0.071  0.228 
              
Country indicators of labor 
conditions          
Fraser Institute EFI ^^             
 
Labor Market Regulations 
part  0.061 0.090 -0.004 -0.096 -0.442 0.082 
              
Global  Competitiveness  Report^^^          
 
Overall Global 
Competitiveness Index  0.010 -0.571 -0.399 -0.213 -0.693 -0.391 
  Hiring and firing practices  -0.240 -0.105 -0.313 -0.415 -0.343 -0.211 
 
Cooperative labor-employer 
relations  -0.073 -0.458 -0.107 0.001 -0.451 -0.396 
 
Flexibility of wage 
determination -0.091 -0.039 -0.287 -0.470 -0.208 -0.173 
  Pay and productivity  -0.222 -0.252 -0.407 -0.507 -0.456 -0.420 
  Overall mkt efficiency  -0.057 -0.406 -0.177 -0.221 -0.691  -0.352 
  Restrictive labor regulations  0.262 -0.347 0.014 0.325 -0.288 -0.048 
   Innovative factors  0.121 -0.434 -0.346 -0.194 -0.590 -0.336 
^ The outcomes and worker reports on labor practices are based on 19 country coefficients,   
controlling for basic job and demographic characteristics (occupation, supervisory status, hours,   
tenure, union, gender, race, marital status, education, disability status).       
^^The Economic Freedom of the World 2006 Annual Report, James Gwartney and Robert  A. Lawson.  Vancouver, B.C.:   The Fraser 
Institute, 2006. 
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Figure 3: Employee Relations and Facility Effectiveness
 